tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8708273719674528189.post5601400094733185793..comments2024-03-22T00:20:38.510-07:00Comments on Adam Riggio writes: The Oppression of Obligation, Research Time, 26/09/2014Adam Riggiohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14606510835439580828noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8708273719674528189.post-53334591964868083992014-09-27T08:24:14.281-07:002014-09-27T08:24:14.281-07:00I agree with your interpretation. Really, it's...I agree with your interpretation. Really, it's not that I'm arguing with Nozick himself when I talk about the problems of conceiving of promises and obligations as involving possible violence. I'm arguing with the political movement of libertarianism that has grown from Nozick's thought. <br /><br />But I actually think you're being too kind to Nozick, in terms of how he expresses his ideas. Like I said, I've actually spoken with people who sincerely believe that moral obligations in all their forms oppress them and destroy their liberty. It's not that they potentially involve violence when parties renege on their promises. Nozick's example of the guy who doesn't want to record his community radio show when it's his turn interprets the simple fact of making promise or living under a moral obligation as itself being a violent act. He defines violence as any kind of force to enable an action that I wouldn't otherwise choose to do. <br /><br />Nozick openly says that no one has any reason to be faithful to promises or obligations precisely because they repress your personal liberty. If you go back to ASU §4, he's describing this scenario as the central thought experiment to make his point about moral obligations in totality. And the person he describes who doesn't want to record his show, even though his entire community takes part, if I can speak in terms of virtue ethics, comes off as a total prick.Adam Riggiohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14606510835439580828noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8708273719674528189.post-68912609045429052432014-09-26T23:55:04.383-07:002014-09-26T23:55:04.383-07:00I wonder whether you read Nozick too unsympathetic...I wonder whether you read Nozick too unsympathetically here (though in a way that is conducive to your case against him). I see his point about promises not about discouraging us from undertaking obligations but about rationally legitimising the conditions under which 'violence' is permissible. In a truly free society, people contract into violence, just as they do everything else. When we promise things to each other, we jointly create a sphere of possible violence in case of one or another party reneges. This is important to the line of reasoning that led the US founding fathers to declare war against Britain. The centrality of establishing liability and compensation in liberal jurisprudence is all about rationalising this sphere of permissible violence still further.Steve Fullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02282125191991729151noreply@blogger.com