tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8708273719674528189.post1189140232016641156..comments2024-03-22T00:20:38.510-07:00Comments on Adam Riggio writes: Progress Isn’t Just Criticism But Creativity ("Realism & Philosophy's Future" Part 2), Composing, 25/10/2013Adam Riggiohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14606510835439580828noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8708273719674528189.post-78253493788375977712013-10-26T15:15:37.913-07:002013-10-26T15:15:37.913-07:00Personally, as a non-philosopher, I'm perhaps ...Personally, as a non-philosopher, I'm perhaps all-too-willing to accept the limits of human knowledge and move on. But I'm happy to think that there are philosophers out there who will accept that only as a last resort. <br /><br />It is rather depressing to think that an adult would choose adherence to a guru over his own intellectual development, but I suppose is not so uncommon. Imagine how exhilarating it would be for him to just dump Heidegger's presuppositions and start afresh. But I suppose the reason he doesn't do that it because it would be scary to lose the sense of progress he assumes has been made. Husserl is a great model in this regard of someone brave enough to walk away from a tradition. <br /><br />I would be interested to try and dig even deeper than the issue of 'how' (how to avoid mental dead-ends) to the question of why: why do philosophy at all? Why should we avoid dead-ends? Peirce was comforted with a sort of engineering logic to it all: think clearly to fix problems; if there's a problem you can't fix with the way you are doing it, try another way, and if still doesn't work, go on to another problem. I don't expect you to have a tidy answer for that but it is something that might be worth addressing in your conclusion. For Harmon, I would say he would feel like abandoning Heidegger risks losing all the gains made in the 20th century. But gains for what? I agree with you that failing to have a good answer for that, the answer probably degenerates into hero-worship: the point of continuing Heideggerian practices is to venerate Heidegger himself.<br /><br />I would tend to adopt a strategic perspective: the end precedes the means. The end in my field is not truth but "a more better union" (let's say) -- but philosophers would probably bristle at the notion that someone else has already decided on what constitutes that "more better". Tom Crosbiehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04942888225118081569noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8708273719674528189.post-41629570640672682542013-10-26T14:30:07.187-07:002013-10-26T14:30:07.187-07:00Here's a really rough framework of how I conce...Here's a really rough framework of how I conceive of "working through a philosophical problem," or any problem in theory or life if you can isolate its core elements.<br /><br />Say my problem is trying to get principles X, Y, and Z to work together. They're complex concepts, and they require a lot of analysis to manipulate and explore. There are a lot of ways to use the concepts, and a lot of valid perspectives to take on them. But only so many — they aren't infinitely variable. So there are limits to how much we can manipulate those concepts to make them work productively together without changing X into W.<br /><br />I think Harman has reached this problem. He has this mutated-Kantian reading of Heidegger (because with GH, there isn't just the thing-in-itself unspecific even in number, but each object in the world has its dark mirror object constituting true reality; I think this is actually worse than the reading of Kant emphasizing the thing-in-itself) that cripples his Object Oriented Ontology approach. I'm willing to grant him that it's a faithful continuation and explication of Heidegger's perspective. But even if that's so, it still leads to the epistemic quietism that he can't get over. He's built a conception of reality (the real is isolated from all relations) where human knowledge is inevitably inadequate.<br /><br />You could even say that I agree with the Peircean idea: He should just get over it and move on. But my essay also diagnoses precisely why Harman can't: because of his fidelity to Heidegger like a guru. In the details of the essay, I note that Harman disparages pragmatism, analytic philosophy, and pretty much all philosophy of science. It's a symptom of his worshipful attitude to Heidegger. Because he can't understand that Heidegger isn't so great, he can't let go of the problem.Adam Riggiohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14606510835439580828noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8708273719674528189.post-82998562971460050052013-10-25T20:02:16.226-07:002013-10-25T20:02:16.226-07:00Good two-parter Adam -- glad to see you're kee...Good two-parter Adam -- glad to see you're keeping the forward momentum despite the inevitable waves of rejection. As I've mentioned before, you've set out on a high-risk strategy of sticking to your guns and writing what you believe should be written, and I admire you for it. The rewards are high too -- you get to keep moving forward in the real task we all set out to do in this game, which is our personal processes of intellectual discovery. <br /><br />As for the Harman piece -- he sounds like a Heideggerian who hasn't moved past Kant. But he also sounds a bit like you, if you'll excuse the comparison: isn't there something to admire in his refusal to move past this point that he genuinely hasn't been able to work through? Most of us would follow Peirce and just get on with things, but I suspect you're enough like him that you'd be willing to keep working on the thing that confuses you most. Again, I admire it.<br /><br />But how that relates to the second part of your paper (as you describe it) is revealing, I think. You chastise Harman as I understand it not on Peircian pragmatist grounds (i.e. he's still stuck on this problem!) but on his failure to differentiate himself from what amounts to a guru. That's unquestionably a major problem throughout the humanities and social sciences (it would be interesting to consider whether it's a problem in the hard sciences). Using him as a lens through which to view this dysfunction in the academy seems quite reasonable and certainly defensible -- but again, most people would draw on Peirce to "prove" that this is indeed a problem.<br /><br />I guess I'm left wondering, if we want to be true to ourselves and work recklessly (let's say, in contrast to safely), what's to stop us from eating our tails? What tools are at our disposal to know that we're being the wrong type of unconventional?Tom Crosbiehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04942888225118081569noreply@blogger.com